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Abstract
Error resilience and energy eﬃciency are two main challenges facing block ciphers
in noisy and resource constrained wireless environments. Traditionally, error correct-
ing codes are used to recover from channel induced errors. However, this two step
operation: encryption followed by error correction adds extra burden on an already
resource constrained environment. Combining the two operations into one primitive
has the potential to achieve eﬃcient error correcting ciphers. However, if such a joint
system is not designed carefully both error correcting capacity and security could be
compromised. For this reason, the design of error correcting ciphers has remained an
open problem for the past 25 years.
In this work, we propose two error correcting block ciphers: the High Diﬀusion
(HD) cipher and the Pyramid cipher. Both ciphers use our recently proposed HD
codes in the diﬀusion layer. The HD cipher is a ten round cipher which uses many
small HD codes, whereas the Pyramid cipher is a ﬁve round cipher which uses a sin-
gle large HD code. We show that the Pyramid cipher is as secure as the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) against linear, diﬀerential and square attacks. We derive
bounds on the error correcting capacity of the proposed ciphers and through simu-
lations show that they are as error resilient as the Reed Solomon codes, outperform
the convolution codes by 60% and are 10% more energy eﬃcient compared to the
traditional systems. We show that in stream modes our ciphers have higher encryp-
tion throughput compared to the AES. Energy analysis veriﬁes that the HD cipher
in stream mode is 40% more energy eﬃcient compared to the AES.
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Introduction
We are increasingly relying on wireless mobile devices for our day to day transactions
and commercial applications. Wireless devices like personal data assistants (PDAs)
are used to execute online transactions and store valuable data such as credit card
numbers. Hence, wireless communication security has gained importance in recent
years. The mobile nature of the wireless devices make them dependent on battery
power which is a constantly depleting resource. Unlike the wired counterparts, the
wireless medium is physically unprotected and can be extremely noisy and bursty.
To protect wireless transmissions, security protocols which were traditionally applied
at the upper layers like application and transport layer are now applied at the lower
layers as well. For example, security protocols like the Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP), Temporal Key Integrity Protocol [65] and the Wiﬁ Protected Access (WPA)
[1] are now employed in the link layer. However, the application of encryption at link
layer creates other issues. For example, encryption and decryption increase trans-
mission delay and hence causes frequent timeouts in the upper layers. The error
sensitivity of decryption operation triggers retransmissions and decreases the trans-
mission throughput. The sensitivity of ciphers towards channel errors is due to the
phenomenon called the avalanche eﬀect [16]. This causes one or more bit errors before
12
decryption to spread randomly to the entire cipherstate with in few round. To illus-
trate the error expansion due to avalanche eﬀect we plot the post decryption bit error
rate for various block lengths of a generic block cipher over a range of channel bit
error rates in Fig. 1.1. We can observe from the ﬁgure that for most of the practical
channel conditions the avalanche eﬀect causes a signiﬁcant error expansion and this
eﬀect increases with the block length.
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Figure 1.1: Error expansion due to avalanche eﬀect
The most widely used technique to combat error propagation in block ciphers is
to use them in stream modes. This is because, when a block cipher is operated in any
of the stream modes, the plaintext is XORed with key stream generated by the block
cipher. As XOR-ing is an error preserving [63] operation, there is no error propa-
gation in stream modes. When block ciphers need to be used in block modes, they
are concatenated with forward error correction (FEC) codes to minimize the num-
ber of retransmissions due to error propagation. The use of error correction codes
however requires allocation of additional computational resources and transmission
power which strains an already resource constrained environment. In order to con-3
serve battery power, newer security protocols [53][43][44][54] are being developed that
are more light weight and energy eﬃcient. Some of the common techniques that have
been used to reduce the energy consumed by cryptographic primitives are: reduction
in number of rounds, use of simple operations (e.g. XORs and shifts), merging mul-
tiple operations, use of lookup tables, reduced block length, etc. However the light
weight security protocols if not designed carefully could cause compromise in security
[9] [34]. We identify energy eﬃciency, error resilience and speed of the underlying
cryptographic primitive are the key factors that need to be jointly addressed by any
wireless security protocol or primitive. The LEX cipher proposed in [8] achieves the
energy eﬃciency and speed by converting the Rijndael block cipher [15] into stream
cipher using an unconventional approach of leaking intermediate cipherstate bytes.
Although this approach appears to be secure, leaking intermediate state information
is known to cause weakness in the cipher [23]. A security-throughput optimization
approach is proposed in [48] that utilizes the ﬂexible block length in certain block
ciphers to maximize the error resilience. Although this approach achieves error re-
silience, the energy consumption due to context switching between diﬀerent block
lengths could be potentially high. An alternate approach for jointly achieving energy
eﬃciency and error resilience in a cipher is to combine error correction and encryp-
tion. [46] was the ﬁrst to propose a public key cipher based on algebraic coding
theory. The security of this system is based on the hardness of the decoding problem
[3]. In order to achieve meaningful security against present day adversaries, the pa-
rameters of this system have to be very large, making it infeasible in practice. This
work was followed by a series of improvements and attacks [26][52] [35][5][22][62].
However, none of these systems were based on modern cryptographic design prin-
ciples and they compromised security for error resilience. Cryptocoding [21] is one4
of the more recently proposed techniques for joint error correction and encryption.
This technique is based on quasigroup (Latin square) string transformation. Here,
the large space of quasigroups translates to a large key space. In order to achieve
error resilience, the data is padded with zeros before encryption and the decryption
algorithm literately corrects errors until the padded zeros are correctly recovered.
This makes the decoding procedure extremely complicated and hence cannot be used
in practice. The diﬃculty in designing error correcting ciphers arise from the fact
that error correction and encryption work at cross purposes to each other. Codes
add redundancy while ciphers remove redundancy and randomize the source. Codes
are usually linear whereas ciphers have to be non-linear. We approach the problem
of using codes in ciphers by observing the similarities between codes and ciphers.
Speciﬁcally we concentrate on the property of diﬀusion, which is exhibited by block
codes and required by block ciphers to spread the non-linearity. Most of the modern
block ciphers including the AES ﬁnalists like Rijndael [15] and Two-Fish [56] derive
their diﬀusion transformations from Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes [10].
However, the generation of diﬀusion matrices in these approaches are ad-hoc, rely on
brute force search and are not intended to make the block cipher error resilience. Also,
using arbitrary FECs in the diﬀusion layer of block ciphers may render the cipher
insecure and achieve sub-optimal error resilience. In this work, we provide a math-
ematical frame work to combine error correction with encryption that maximizes the
security and the error resilience of the cipher. We use a speciﬁc class of channel codes
called High Diﬀusion codes [41][49] that we recently proposed. These codes possess
the branch number property [15] required by the diﬀusion layer of a block cipher and
their burst error correction capability is well suited for wireless environments. We use
the HD codes to build two error correcting block ciphers that we call the HD cipher5
and the Pyramid cipher. The HD cipher is a ten round block cipher with a coding
rate of 128
288 whereas the Pyramid cipher is a ﬁve round block cipher with a coding
rate of 128
192. We show that the both the HD and the Pyramid ciphers are as secure as
the popular Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher [17] against the well known
attacks. Based on the minimum distance decoding we show that the error correcting
capacity of the HD cipher and the Pyramid cipher used in block modes [59] is seven
and four bytes per block respectively. To evaluate the energy requirement of our pro-
posed ciphers we setup a testbed consisting of 32 bit processors that have comparable
architecture to most of the wireless devises. We compare the energy consumption of
the Pyramid cipher with a traditional concatenated system comprising of AES cipher
followed by a Reed Solomon (RS) codes that match the error correcting capacity of
the HD and the Pyramid ciphers. Experimental results reveal that the HD cipher and
Pyramid cipher encryption operations are 30% and 10% more energy eﬃcient com-
pared to the encryption-encoding operations of the concatenated system. Whereas,
HD and Pyramid decryptions are 12% and 6% more energy eﬃcient compared to the
decoding-decryption operation of the concatenated system. We also evaluate the error
resilience of the proposed ciphers under various channel models. Simulation results
reveal that under wireless like channel conditions, the error resilience of the HD and
Pyramid ciphers is equivalent to that of the concatenated system. We then implement
the proposed ciphers in the counter mode. Due to the expansion of the cipherstate
in HD and Pyramid, they have higher encryption throughput compared to the AES
cipher. Moreover, the encryption throughput of these ciphers can be further increased
by decreasing the coding rate of the HD codes used in these ciphers. Also, in the
counter mode, like other secure block ciphers, the HD and the Pyramid ciphers act as
pseudorandom number generators. To test the quality of random numbers generated6
by the proposed ciphers, we subjected them to the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) recommended DIEHARD statistical test suite. Pseudoran-
dom tests reveal that both HD and the Pyramid are cryptographically sound random
number generators. We propose to replace the AES cipher in the counter mode with
cipher block chaining protocol (CCMP) (see Section 4.4.2) that is used in the current
IEEE 802.11i standard with the HD cipher. The higher encryption throughput of
the HD cipher translates to 40% improvement in energy eﬃciency of our HD-CCMP
protocol.Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we give a brief background on block ciphers, their properties and the
design strategies. We also brieﬂy introduce the Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
which is the current standard on block ciphers. We then describe the classiﬁcation
of error correcting codes and give a brief description on linear block codes. Then we
discuss some notable previous work in the area of joint error correction and encryption.
2.1 Classiﬁcation of Ciphers
Cipher is the term used to describe algorithms/techniques that have two distinct
functions: encryption and decryption. Encryption is a process of scrambling (enci-
phering) information, the plaintext, using some secret knowledge, the secret key, into
unintelligible form, the ciphertext. Decryption is the inverse process of encryption,
where the ciphertext is unscrambled (deciphered) back to plaintext using the same or
a diﬀerent secret key. Ciphers for which the encryption secret key is diﬀerent from the
decryption secret key are called public ciphers. The RSA, Elgamal, Elliptic curves [60]
are some of the commonly used public key ciphers. On the other hand, ciphers which
have the same encryption and decryption keys are called private key or symmetric
key ciphers. The Data Encryption Standard (DES), RC4 and Advanced Encryption
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Figure 2.1: Classiﬁcation of Ciphers.
Standard (AES) are some of the commonly used symmetric ciphers. Symmetric ci-
phers can encrypt the plaintext one bit or a block (more than a bit) at a time. The
sub-class of symmetric ciphers that encrypt the plaintext one bit at a time are called
stream ciphers. For example, the RC4 cipher is a stream cipher. Symmetric ciphers
that encrypt the plaintext a block at a time are called block ciphers. For example,
the AES block cipher encrypts 128 bits of the plaintext in one encryption. Block
ciphers have many modes of operation. The most commonly used block modes are
the electronic code book mode (ECB) and the cipher block chaining mode (CBC).
However, block ciphers can also be used to encrypt the plaintext one bit at a time
by employing them in the stream modes. The counter mode (CTR) and the output
feed back mode (OFB) are some of the standard stream modes for any block cipher.
Fig. 2.1 summarizes the classiﬁcation of ciphers.
2.2 Block Ciphers
Block ciphers encrypt the plaintext one block (more than 1 bit) at a time. In most
of the modern block ciphers a single function F, which may not be secure by itself,
is repeated a number of times, until the desired level of security is achieved. Such9
ciphers are called iterated block ciphers.
The security provided by any cipher can be measured in terms of the plaintext,
P, the ciphertext, C and the key, K, used. The, conditional entropy H(KjC), called
key equivocation, is the measure of how much information about the key is revealed
by the ciphertext in case of ciphertext only attack [60]. This is given by,
H(KjC) = H(K) + H(P) ¡ H(C)
where H is entropy function. However, most of the modern day block ciphers
are secure against this type of attack. There are other kinds of attacks possible
such as known plaintext, chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks. Most of
the practical cryptanalysis techniques are a combination of the above attacks. For
example, the diﬀerential cryptanalysis [7] is a chosen plaintext attack and the linear
cryptanalysis [45] is a known plaintext attack. Any new block cipher is believed to
be secure, if it is computationally infeasible to derive the secret key under all known
types of cryptanalysis. Further, researchers over the years have identiﬁed important
properties that can be used to gauge the security of cryptographic algorithms. We
discuss these properties in the next Section.
2.2.1 Properties of Block Ciphers
Claude Shannon in 1949 described the general setting for treating cryptosystems in
the seminal work ‘Communications Theory of Secrecy Systems’ [58]. Here, he suggests
two properties diﬀusion and confusion, as essentials for the design of ciphers. These
properties are relevant even today and almost all of the modern day block ciphers
exhibit these properties. A brief description of diﬀusion and confusion follows.10
Diﬀusion
The property of diﬀusion implies that the statistical structure of the message space,
which leads to its redundancy, is dissipated into long range statistics of the ciphertext.
It is a quantitative notion in the sense that dependency on each plaintext and key
bit is to be spread to several ciphertext bits. This makes the relation between the
plaintext and ciphertext as complex as possible. Diﬀusion is usually achieved by
repeated permutations. The part of the round function F that achieves diﬀusion is
called the diﬀusion layer. Eﬃciency of the cipher is also aﬀected by its diﬀusion
properties, that is, if diﬀusion can be achieved in fewer operations we would require
fewer rounds to achieve security. Moreover there are cryptanalysis techniques that
exploit slow diﬀusion of ciphers, for example are diﬀerential cryptanalysis of the DES
[7] exploits the slow diﬀusion in the Feistel structure [16].
Confusion
This is more of a qualitative concept, in the sense that a non-linear relationship is
to be expected between all ciphertext bits and plaintext/key bits. The property of
confusion makes the relation between the ciphertext key space complex. Confusion
is provided in block ciphers by substitution boxes (S-boxes). These components are
the main non-linear operators in most block ciphers. An S-box fulﬁls the criteria for
confusion if every bit in its output depends non-linearly on each input bit and vice
versa (for invertible S-boxes). If this is not the case then the bias in the S-boxes
may be exploited to break the cipher. For example, the linear cryptanalysis gathers
information about the key by ﬁrst ﬁnding approximate linear expressions for S-boxes
and then extending them to the whole cipher. Therefore design of S-boxes is crucial
to maintain the security of block ciphers.11
Avalanche Eﬀect
The term ‘avalanche’ comes from Feistel [16], and refers to the observed property
of diﬀerence propagation with respect to a tiny change in the input. The change
of a single input bit generally produces multiple bit-changes after one round, many
more bit-changes after the second round, and so on, until about half of the block will
randomly change. In any block cipher we would want a single bit to aﬀect every output
bit: if a single bit is ﬂipped we would want half the bits in the output to be ﬂipped
(diﬀusion) independent of the position of the bits (confusion). Therefore avalanche
in a cipher has been used widely as criterion to study cryptographic functions. In the
next section, we give an overview of two basic strategies used to design block ciphers
and how they cause and spread the avalanche eﬀect.
2.2.2 Prominent Block Cipher Design Strategies
The two most prominent block cipher design strategies are the Feistel structure and
the wide trail strategy. In this section, we brieﬂy introduce both these strategies.
Feistel structure
This is one of the most widely used block cipher design strategies. Block ciphers
like the DES, Blowﬁsh, RC5 and FEAL [47] are all based on this structure. In the
Feistel structure, the plaintext in each round i, is treated as two separate halves
(Xi = XL
i jjXR
i ), left and right. In each round, only one half of the input cipherstate
is operated upon. Any non-linear F-function which non-linearly transforms half of the
plaintext using key bits can be used in the Feistel structure. That is, F : f0;1gn=2 £
f0;1gm ! f0;1gn=2, where m is the number key bits. The round function in the
Feistel structure can be described as follows, Xi+1 = (Fki(XL
i ) © XR
i )jjXL
i . Where
ki is the round key. This design makes the encryption identical to the decryption12
except for the reversal of the key schedule. Feistel structures that operate on unequal
divisions in the plaintext (i.e. jXLj 6= jXRj) are called unbalanced Feistel structures.
The main weakness of Fiestel structures is that each round transformation always
keeps some bits of the input block constant. This fact is used in many attacks. For
example the diﬀerential [7] and linear [45] cryptanalysis attacks on the DES cipher
extends diﬀerential and linear characteristics of one round to multiple rounds using
this weakness.
Wide trail strategy
The wide trail strategy [13] is based partially on the substitution permutation net-
work [59]. Here the entire input block is transformed in every round. Although this
approach makes each round heavier compared to the Feistel structure, it helps in
decreasing the number of rounds required for encryption. Block ciphers like Rijndael
[17], Square [12] and Shark [55] are based on this strategy.
Most cryptanalytic attacks make use of the imbalances in the mappings between
the diﬀerences/correlation in the ciphertext to a particular diﬀerence/correlation in
the plaintext or the round key. The wide trail strategy aims to spread the diﬀer-
ence/correlation characteristics to the entire cipherstate in a few rounds. This ap-
proach would prevent the cryptanalytic attacks that rely on the propagation of diﬀer-
ence/correlation characteristics within sub-blocks of the input block. The spreading
strength of the diﬀusion layer of a cipher is the key to achieve the wide trail strategy.
However, diﬀusion is just a concept. In order to measure diﬀusion, a metric called
branch number is often used (see 3.1). Branch number is the sum of the input and
output active bytes (nonzero diﬀerence in input/output blocks). The wide trail strat-
egy provides a simpliﬁed technique to maximize the sum of the active bytes (trail of
active bytes) over a few rounds. The lower bound on the sum of active bytes also13
provides a lower bound on the resistance oﬀered by the cipher to many cryptanalytic
attacks. In fact the Rijndael block cipher which is based on the wide trail strategy
has been selected as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In the next section
we give an overview of the AES cipher.
2.3 Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
2.3.1 Diﬀerential Cryptanalysis
Diﬀerential cryptanalysis, as the name suggests analyzes the propagation of diﬀer-
ences (plaintext/ciphertext) through the cipher to derive the key bits. Consider two
plaintexts P and P 0. The diﬀerence between these plaintexts is ±P = P © P 0. Since
© is the key mixing operation, ±P is key independent. Diﬀerence between the cipher-
states of the corresponding plaintexts after round s is denoted by ±Cs. A s round
diﬀerential characteristic is a s + 1 tuple that lists the diﬀerence in the cipherstate
starting from the ﬁrst round, (®0;®1;:::;®s). The probability, pD, of this characteristic
is given by,
pD = Pr(±Cs = ®s;±Cs¡1 = ®s¡1;:::;±C1 = ®1=±P = ®0): (2.3.1)
However, this probability is very diﬃcult to calculate. In [33] Lai and Massey pro-
posed a Markov cipher model for iterated block ciphers and showed that for indepen-
dent and uniformly random round keys, the probability of s round characteristic can
be approximated by,
pD =
s Y
i=1
Pr(±C1 = ®ij±P = ®i¡1): (2.3.2)
About pD2N plaintext diﬀerences (right pairs) follow the characteristic, where N is
the block length of the cipher. The steps required to attack a cipher using diﬀerential
cryptanalysis as given in [31] and is summarized here. The attacker ﬁnds an r ¡ 114
round characteristic (±P;±C1;:::;±Cr¡1). Then the attacker uniformly selects P and
P 0 with diﬀerence ±P and obtains the corresponding ciphertexts Cr and C0
r. Then
the attacker guesses the round keys such that the output diﬀerence ±Cr¡1 is observed.
For every correct output diﬀerence observed a counter for the corresponding key is
incremented. Eventually, after observing several plaintext pairs the correct key would
emerge. The eﬀectiveness of this technique can be quantiﬁed by the signal to noise
ratio,
SNR =
k £ pD
¸ £ °
; (2.3.3)
where k is the number of possible values of the key, ° is the number of keys suggested
by each right pair and ¸ is the ratio of right pairs to all pairs. We can observe that
higher the diﬀerence propagation probability pD higher is the success of diﬀerential
cryptanalysis. The non-zero bytes in ±Ci are called active S-boxes/bytes. The dif-
ference propagation probability, Ps, of an active S-box is the relative number of all
input pairs, that for a given input diﬀerence, gives rise to a speciﬁc output diﬀerence
[14]. The probability of one round characteristic in terms of Ps is,
Pr(±C1j±P) · (Ps)
Ns; (2.3.4)
where, Ns is the number of active S-boxes in the one round trail. Hence, a lower
bound on the number of active bytes/S-boxes in any diﬀerential trail will give a lower
bound on the resistance of the cipher to diﬀerential cryptanalysis.
2.3.2 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis [45] is a method of deriving key bits by forming linear expressions
of the form,
(P ¢ ®) © (C ¢ ¯) = (K ¢ °) (2.3.5)15
where P and C are plain and ciphertexts, K is the secret key, ®; ¯; ° are selection
vectors and ¢ is the dot product. jpL¡1=2j¡2 measures the success of linear cryptanal-
ysis, where pL is probability of the linear expression (2.3.5). A linear characteristic
is a collection of selection vectors that maximize the success of linear cryptanalysis.
One of the ﬁrst steps to construct linear expressions is to form the ﬁrst round linear
characteristic. The r round characteristic can be obtained by concatenating the ﬁrst
round characteristic r times. The success probability of an r round linear expression
is,
1=2 + 2
N¡1
r Y
i=1
(pLi ¡ 1=2) (2.3.6)
where N is the block length. Since substitution is the only non-linear step in most of
the block ciphers including the proposed Pyramid cipher. We can express the success
probability of the linear expression in terms of the number of active S-boxes in a
multiple round linear trail. The active S-boxes in a round are determined by the non
zero symbols in the selection vectors at the input of the round. The linearity of an
active S-box can be approximated to the maximum input-output correlation exhibited
by it. The correlation (measure of linearity) of a linear trail (multiple rounds) can be
approximated to the product of input-output correlations of its active S-boxes [14].
Hence, a lower bound on the number of active bytes in any linear trail will give a
lower bound on the resistance of the cipher to linear cryptanalysis.
2.3.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
The iterated block cipher Rijndael [15] was selected as the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES)[17], to replace the weaker Data Encryption Standard (DES)[59].
AES has a block length of 128 bits, and there are three allowable key lengths, namely
128, 192 and 256 bits. The number of rounds depends on the key length. For key
lengths 128, 192 and 256 bits respectively 10, 12 and 14 rounds are used. A block16
diagram of one round function of the AES cipher is given in Fig. 2.2. The round
function of AES is composed of substitution (by S-boxes), shift row (SR) and mix
column (MC). Every round function is preceded by a key mixing operation with
the round key. The 11 round keys are generated from the secret key using a key
expansion algorithm. The initial 128 bit plaintext is arranged as a 4 £ 4 matrix of
16 bytes referred to as the cipherstate. During the substitution operation, each byte
is independently substituted using the S-box. The SR operation shifts rows in the
cipherstate corresponding to the row number. That is, the ﬁrst row is not shifted,
the second row is shifted by one byte and so on. The MC operation (see Fig. 2.3)
multiplies each column of the cipherstate independently with a 4 £ 4, 16 byte MC
matrix. The key mixing is just a simple XOR of the cipherstate with the round
key. Note that, the MC operation is not performed in the ﬁnal (10th) round of the
cipher. This is done to facilitate the use of the same algorithm for both encryption
and decryption.
In the design of the Rijndael cipher a MC matrix with a branch number of 5 is used.
The lower bound on the number of active bytes over any trail of four rounds is shown
to be at least 25 [17]. The substitution boxes in the Rijndael have diﬀerence ratios
and correlations of 2¡6 and 2¡3 respectively. For a four round diﬀerence and linear
trail, the maximum diﬀerence propagation ratio is 2¡150 and the maximum correlation
ratio 2¡75. This explains the resistance to diﬀerence and linear cryptanalysis.
2.4 Classiﬁcation of Codes
The term codes refers to a broad class of techniques and algorithms that have two basic
operations: encoding and decoding. Encoding is a procedure that adds redundancy
into a given message and transforms it into a larger codeword. These codewords are17
Figure 2.2: The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption.
Figure 2.3: The Mix Column operation in the AES cipher.
decoded back into the corresponding messages by the decoding procedure. Depending
on the amount of redundancy and the type of code, the decoding may recover the
correct message even in the presence of one or more errors in the received codeword.
There are two basic types of error correction codes: convolutional codes and linear
block codes. Encoding procedure in convolutional codes is memory based and the
message to codeword mapping depends on both the current state of the encoder and
the previous message. Linear block codes on the other hand have a predetermined
message to codeword mapping usually deﬁned by a generator matrix. There are many
sub categories in linear block codes. Some of the interesting ones are cyclic codes,
perfect codes and low density parity check (LDPC) codes. Cyclic codes are linear
block codes where any valid codeword is a cyclic shift of on another valid codeword18
Figure 2.4: Classiﬁcation of Codes.
in the same codespace. Cyclic codes can be binary (all codewords belong to the ﬁeld
GF(2)) or q-ary (codewords belong to GF(q > 2)). Examples of cyclic codes are
BCH codes and Reed Solomon (RS) codes. The summery of classiﬁcation is given in
Fig. 2.4
2.5 Linear Block Codes
A linear block code, usually denoted by [n;k;q], encodes fGF(q)gk messages to
fGF(q)gn codewords by multiplying them with a k £ n generator matrix or (n ¡ k)
degree generator polynomial. For example, if m(x) represents the input message and
g(x) represents the generator polynomial, then the codeword is, c(x) = m(x)g(x).
The linearity comes from the fact that, for any two messages m1(x) and m2(x), we
have c1(x)©c2(x) = (m1(x)©m2(x))g(x). If the received codewords are not perfectly
devisable by the generator, an error is detected. However, in order to correct errors,
sophisticated algorithms are used. The performance or the error correcting capacity
of any linear block code is heavily dependent on the minimum distance, dmin, between19
the codewords. This is the minimum hamming distance between any two valid code-
words in the code space. A larger dmin implies better error resilience. The Singleton
bound, dmin · n¡k +1, upper bounds this minimum distance. From this bound we
can observe that a larger codeword length and a smaller message length increases the
error resilience. However, this also increases the redundancy and hence transmission
costs. The coding rate of any code is the fraction k=n. The fundamental problem of
coding theory is to ﬁnd codes that jointly maximize coding rate and dmin.
An important class of linear block codes that is of interest to our work is the
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes. The MDS codes are the sub class of
linear, cyclic, q-ary block codes that satisfy the Singleton bound to equality. That is
to say that, a [n;k;q] MDS code has a minimum distance of dmin = n ¡ k + 1. This
is the largest possible minimum distance achievable by a linear block code.
2.6 Previous Work on Joint Error Correction and
Encryption
Traditionally error correction and encryption in communication networks have been
addressed independently. Although many mathematical relationships between coding
and cryptography have been analyzed and explored [64], there have been only a few
successful attempts in the past to combine coding and cryptography operations into
one function. Several researchers have studied the trade-oﬀ between encryption and
error correction by trying to combine these functionalities in one unit. Some of the
notable works are brieﬂy discussed.
2.6.1 McEliece Public Key Cryptosystem
McEliece proposed the ﬁrst public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory
in 1978 [46]. The idea behind this scheme was based on the fact that the decoding of20
an arbitrary linear code is an NP-hard problem [3]. This scheme constructs a (k;n), t-
error correcting code where k is the message length and n is the codeword length using
a generator matrix G. The message, m, is encoded to produce the ciphertext c using
the equation c = mSGP +e, where S and P refer to the substitution and permutation
matrices respectively and e is a random vector with weight t0 · t. The key, SGP
(the product of the matrices S;G and P, is published and the authorized users are
provided with the private keys S;G and the key to generate e. This is not really a
joint error correction and encryption code, since the code is unable to correct any
channel induced errors. However, these schemes have the advantage of lower power
consumption by using the same hardware components available for error correction
to achieve security. Conceptually, however, it is easy to extend this code by setting
t0 · t0
max < t, where t0
max is the maximum weight of e so that the code is able to correct
t¡t0
max link induced errors. Since the ﬁrst scheme by McEliece, other researchers have
worked on improving the information rate of the system [29, 52, 35, 57] by making the
error vector carry some extra information. However, most of these systems suﬀer from
information leakage which introduces weaknesses in these systems. Berson proposed
two attacks [5] on the McEliece system that makes it easier for an attacker to crack
the code. In [62], the authors propose two variations to the McEliece scheme: one
using a hash function on the error vector e and the other a trap-door function f(m;e)
to enhance the security of the basic McEliece scheme.
2.6.2 Sun’s Private Key Cryptosystem
This is a private-key cryptosystem based on burst error correcting codes [61]. Here,
the generator matrix of a burst error correcting code is and a permutation matrix
are kept secret between the sender and the receiver. The ciphertext is obtained by
encoding the message XORed with a predetermined burst sequence and permuting21
the result using the permutation matrix. The decryption is performed by inverse
permuting the ciphertext and then decoding the received codeword. However, due to
the addition of burst errors prior to transmission, the true error correcting capacity
of this scheme is signiﬁcantly reduced.
2.6.3 Kak’s D-sequences
In [30] Subhash Kak proposed a unique approach to joint encryption and error-
correction. This solution is based on decimal expansions of fractions known as D-
sequences. It is shown that the encoding operation is equivalent to that of exponen-
tiation in ﬁnite ﬁeld, which is similar to encryption in public key ciphers. However,
this work has not been scalable and did not attract further research.
2.6.4 Godoy and Pereira Scheme
The functions of error correction and security were truly integrated in works like the
Godoy and Pereira Scheme [22] which was intended for incorporation into existing
systems without making any fundamental changes. The idea behind this scheme is to
derive new generator matrices from existing generator matrices by row permutations.
The security of the system relies on the change and secrecy of the generator matrices.
Since the number of generator matrices for the given code are ﬁnite and countable,
this scheme is susceptible to brute force attack on the generator matrix.
2.6.5 Hwang and Rao Scheme
Hwang and Rao proposed two secret error-correcting code (SECC) schemes [26]. This
is a private key cipher that uses Perparata codes [39], which are a class of non-linear
channel codes. Like many of the other schemes, this scheme suﬀers from reduction
in error correcting capacity. In fact, in order to achieve meaningful error correction22
capacity, the parameters of the system have to be very large leading to higher compu-
tational complexity. Also, this system was found vulnerable to the known plaintext
attack conducted in [67].
2.6.6 Cryptcoding
Cryptocoding [21] is one of the more recently proposed techniques for joint error cor-
rection and encryption. This technique is based on quasigroup (Latin square) string
transformation. A quasigroup of order 16 is chosen over 2480 possibilities when encod-
ing and decoding functions are generated. The space of quasigroup gives the security
for such a technique. Every message is padded with a bunch of zeros before the en-
coding/encryption operation. The presence of zeros is then veriﬁed by the decoding
procedure and the decoding is repeated by ﬂipping the received codeword symbols
until the zero pad is recovered. Although this technique achieves both security and
error correction. The decoding procedure is extremely complicated and cannot be
used in a resource constrained environment.Chapter 3
High Diﬀusion Codes
1
We look for channel codes that are not just good in error correction capabili-
ties but also possess properties that make them useful as building blocks of ciphers.
Speciﬁcally, we derive two distinct criteria that these codes must satisfy:
² Security Criterion: Since we intend to use the new code in the diﬀusion layer
of a block cipher, we require the code to spread the statistical properties of the
input block to a large section of the output block.
² Error Resilience Criterion: We do not want to compromise the error correction
capabilities of the code in order to meet the security criterion. Hence we want
the codes to have best possible error correction capability. The number of errors
that can be corrected by block codes is governed by the pairwise minimum
distance between the codewords [66]. A large minimum distance would ensure
good error resilience property.
In this chapter we look at the existence of such codes and analyze their prop-
erties. A metric to measure diﬀusion called “Branch Number” is described in the
1part of this work was done in collaboration with Karthik Narayan (“On the Design of Secure
Error Resilient Diﬀusion Layers for Block Ciphers”)
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next section. Then, we show the existence of codes that possess maximum possible
branch number that do not compromise on the error correction capability. We call
these error correcting codes as High Diﬀusion (HD) codes. Further we discuss the
properties of HD codes and show that they indeed possess the best possible diﬀusion.
Hence, making them an ideal candidate for block ciphers. We then describe several
ways of constructing HD codes.
3.1 Branch Number
To deﬁne High Diﬀusion codes, we need a metric to measure diﬀusion. We use branch
number of a function as a primary measure of its diﬀusion. For any function there
are two ways of measuring the branch number, one is the diﬀerential measure and
the other is the linear measure.
Deﬁnition 3.1.1. The diﬀerential branch number of a transformation Á mapping a
k-tuple onto an n-tuple is deﬁned as
B
diff
d (Á) = min
dH(x1;x2)6=0
fdH(x1;x2) + dH(Á(x1);Á(x2))g (3.1.0)
where x1 and x2 are two input k-tuples (x1 6= x2) and dH is the byte Hamming
distance [24].
Deﬁnition 3.1.2. The linear branch number of a transformation Á on mapping a
k-tuple x onto an n-tuple is deﬁned as
B
lin
d (Á) = min
x6=0
fw(x) + w(Á(x))g (3.1.0)
where w(:) is the Hamming weight in number of non-zero symbols.
If the function Á is linear, both linear and diﬀerential branch numbers for that
function are the same.
3.2 Deﬁnition of HD Codes
Let us consider an [n;k;q] block code, deﬁned on the Galois ﬁeld (GF) of order q;
where n refers to the number of output symbols and k refers to the number of input25
symbols. The HD codes are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.2.1. A [n;k;q] code C, is said to be a High-Diﬀusion (HD) code with
the encoding operation, µ, if B
lin;diff
d (µ) = n + 1.
That is, the branch number of HD codes should be exactly equal to n + 1. We
denote the function that measures branch number as B().
3.3 Properties of HD Codes
In this section, we show that the HD codes possess the maximum possible diﬀusion
and error correction capacity as speciﬁed in the design criteria.
3.3.1 Optimality in diﬀusion
By deﬁnition, HD codes have a branch number of n+1. By Lemma 3.3.1, this is the
upper bound. Hence the diﬀusion is optimal.
Lemma 3.3.1. The upper bound of branch number is n + 1.
Proof. For a one byte diﬀerence in the messages, the corresponding codewords have
to diﬀer by all n bytes to maintain the branch number of n + 1. Since there are only
n bytes in every codeword, it is not possible to get a branch number greater than
n + 1.
3.3.2 Optimality in error correction
We prove that HD codes are maximum distance separable codes (MDS) [39] and
hence show that they are optimal in terms of the minimum distance.
Theorem 3.3.2. An [n;k;q] HD code with encoding operation µ, is an MDS code
with minimum distance dmin = n ¡ k + 1.
Proof. Consider two messages mi and mj and the corresponding codewords ci and cj.
By the deﬁnition of HD codes (Deﬁnition 3.2.1) we have,
dH(ci;cj) + dH(mi;mj) ¸ B(µ)
dH(ci;cj) + dH(mi;mj) ¸ n + 1
dH(ci;cj) ¸ n ¡ dH(mi;mj) + 126
Since the messages are from a k-dimensional space maximum value of dH(mi;mj) is
k,
) dH(ci;cj) = dmin ¸ n ¡ k + 1 (3.3.-3)
From Equation 3.3.-3 we see that HD codes satisfy the Singleton bound [39] with
equality, which implies that HD codes are in fact MDS codes.
The bound on error correction capacity, t, of HD codes is derived from the mini-
mum distance between codewords as follows:
t = b
dmin
2
c
) t = b
n ¡ k + 1
2
c (3.3.-3)
3.3.3 Totally positive generator matrix
Deﬁnition 3.3.1. A rectangular matrix G = (aij);i = 1;¢¢¢ ;k;j = 1;¢¢¢ ;n is called
totally positive if all its minors (determinants of sub-matrices) of any order are positive
[19].
Although the original deﬁnition in [19] is for matrices of real values, it can be
easily extended to the case with elements in Galois ﬁeld GF(2m).
Theorem 3.3.3. Over a ﬁeld F, the linear transformation of k-tuples in k dimen-
sional space V k into n-tuples in n(> k) dimensional space V n by an operation y = xG
achieves the branch number of n+1 if (suﬃcient) and only if (necessary) G is a totally
positive matrix.
Proof. First we prove that the necessary condition to satisfy the branch number
properties is the total positivity. From Deﬁnitions 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and Lemma 3.3.1, for
transformation G to be diﬀusive, we require that
d(x1;x2) + d(x1G;x2G) > n + 1
) w(x1 © x2) + w(x1G © x2G) > n + 1 (3.3.-3)
Since G is a linear transformation, (3.3.3) implies
w(x1 © x2) + w((x1 © x2)G) > n + 1 (3.3.-3)
Let x1 © x1 = e. Then (3.3.3) reduces to
w(e) + w(eG) > n + 1 (3.3.-3)27
w(e) minfw(eG)g
0 0
1 n
2 n ¡ 1
. . .
. . .
r n ¡ (r ¡ 1)
. . .
. . .
k n ¡ k + 1
Table 3.1: Minimum change in the output to maintain branch number.
The minimum values of w(eG) corresponding to the values of w(e) to satisfy (3.3.3)
are as given in Table I.
It can be seen that for w(e) = r, minfw(eG)g = n¡(r¡1). Let the columns of G
be denoted by hj;j = 1;¢¢¢ ;n. Then with a given r for r = 1;¢¢¢ ;k we require G to
have at most r ¡ 1 columns such that e ¢ hj = 0. This implies that in the r £ n sub-
matrix formed by selecting the rows of G corresponding to the non-zero elements of e,
every r £r sub-matrix (contiguous as well as non-contiguous) should be of full rank.
Since the r non-zero elements in e can occur at any r out of k positions, this implies
that every r £ r sub-matrix of G should be of full rank i.e., positive for r = 1;¢¢¢ ;k.
Thus by Deﬁnition 3.3.1, G should be a totally positive matrix.
Next we prove that the total positivity of the transformation matrix is suﬃcient
to achieve the maximum branch number. If G is a totally positive matrix, every
r £ r sub-matrix is positive i.e., has full rank for r = 1;¢¢¢ ;k. Let the rows of G be
ai;i = 1;¢¢¢ ;k. Then the linear combination of any r rows,
Pr
i=1 ®iai with ®i > 0
results in an n-tuple with at-most r¡1 zero elements leading to w(e)+w(eG) = n+1
and hence achieves the branch number. While this proof explicitly addresses the case
of diﬀerential branch number property, the case of linear branch number property is
implicit.
3.4 Construction of HD Codes
Unlike usual error correcting codes, the deﬁnition of HD codes involves pairs of mes-
sages and their associated codewords. This makes deriving a closed form expression
for the construction of the codes tricky. A brute force search produces the complete
mapping but has the highest expected runtime. We have, therefore, developed three
diﬀerent shortcut techniques to generate HD codes.28
3.4.1 Transformation from Reed Solomon (RS) codes
We have shown that all HD codes are MDS codes (See Theorem 3.3.2). Reed Solomon
(RS) codes are a subclass of MDS codes. So another way of constructing a subclass
of HD codes is as follows: a) start with the generator matrix of any [q ¡ 1;k;q] RS
code in systematic form (Grs = [IP]) b) P sub-matrix of Grs satisﬁes the branch
number properties (Theorem 3.4.1). Therefore set the generator matrix of a HD code
to P, (i.e. Ghd = P). For example, to generate a [6;4;256] HD code, we can take
a [10;4;256] RS code. The generator matrix of this RS code has a 4 £ 4 identity
matrix and a 4£6 parity check matrix. The parity check sub-matrix of this RS code
is actually one of the generators of a [6;4;256] HD code.
Theorem 3.4.1. Parity check submatrix of a systematic RS generator matrix gener-
ates a HD codes.
Proof. The parity check submatrix of a RS generator matrix in systematic form is
totally positive (Theorem 15.6 in [25]). From Theorem 3.3.3 it follows that the branch
number of the parity check matrix is n + 1.
3.4.2 Searching totally positive generator matrices
Theorem 3.3.3 serves as a guideline for designing transforms to achieve the desired
branch number properties. However, the testing of all possible square sub matrices
of a matrix for positivity has an exponential order complexity. This can be reduced
to polynomial order by testing only for initial minors (see Theorem 9 of [18]). This
approach reduces the number of minors required to be tested for an n £ n matrix
from
Ã
2n
n
!
¡ 1 to n2.
3.4.3 Puncturing existing codes
This gives us an easy way to generate new HD codes from existing HD codes.
Theorem 3.4.2. Punctured HD codes are HD codes.29
Proof. Let C be an [n;k;q] HD code and C0 be the punctured [n¡1;k;q] code obtained
from C. Let mi, mj be any two messages with their corresponding codewords ci, cj in
C and c0
i,c0
j in C0. We know that C is an HD code, therefore dH(mi;mj)+dH(ci;cj) ¸
n + 1. We know that, c0
i and c0
j are obtained by puncturing ci and cj in one symbol
position. This implies that dH(mi;mj)+dH(c0
i;c0
j) ¸ n. Hence, C0 is an HD code.
3.5 Conclusions
High Diﬀusion codes possess the best possible diﬀusion and yet satisfy the Singleton
bound for the minimum distance between codewords thus making them ideal can-
didates for error resilient cryptographic primitives. Although there is no systematic
technique to generate HD codes, the ﬂexibility to generate HD generator matrices
from RS generator matrices makes it easy to derive large HD codes without having
to go through brute force search. The close relationship of HD codes with the pop-
ular Reed Solomon codes makes them easy to study, analyze and port into existing
systems.Chapter 4
The High Diﬀusion Cipher
The diﬀusion property of HD codes can be used in the construction of the diﬀusion
layer of a block cipher. We look at the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher
design structure and propose to replace its diﬀusion layer with HD codes. We call
this the High Diﬀusion cipher. Security of HD cipher is analyzed with respect to the
best known cryptanalytic techniques like linear, diﬀerential and square attacks. We
show that HD cipher is as secure as the AES under these attacks. Finally, we analyze
the error resilience of the HD cipher to bursty channel errors.
4.1 Structure and Design
The HD cipher [42] is a key-alternating [11] block cipher, composed of 10 iterations
of round function and key mixing operations. The round function consists of three
layers: a) the non linear substitution layer, b) symbol transposition layer and c) the
High Diﬀusion encoding layer. A block diagram of the HD cipher encryption is given
in Fig. 4.1. Note that, the HD encoding is not performed in the ﬁnal round. The
input data, as it goes through each round of the cipher, is referred to as the cipher
state. Note that, the output cipher state of the key mixing layer of round r¡1 forms
the input cipher state to the next round r. However, when r = 10, the output cipher
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Figure 4.1: Block Diagram of High Diﬀusion Cipher.
state is the ciphertext (keystream in CTR mode). The 10 round HD-cipher operates
on plaintext size of 128 bits to produce an output ciphertext (or keystream in CTR
mode) of 288 bits. The secret key size required by the HD cipher is 288 bits. All
the operations in HD cipher are performed in the ﬁnite ﬁeld of order 28, denoted by
GF(256). A detailed description of all the layers of HD cipher follows.
4.1.1 Key mixing layer
The key mixing layer (see Fig. 4.1) follows every round function and is also performed
once before the ﬁrst round. Key mixing is a bitwise XOR operation of the cipher32
state with the round key. The eleven round keys required for the eleven key mixing
operations are generated using a key expansion algorithm. In HD cipher we use a
key expansion algorithm which is similar to that of the AES key expansion algorithm
[17]. However, we redesign the key expansion to expand a 288 bit secret key instead
of the regular 128 ¡ 256 bit secret key. Since, the AES key expansion algorithm is
easily expandable to any byte size, we do not concentrate on the design details.
4.1.2 Substitution layer
The substitution layer uses an invertible local non-linear transformation called the
S-box. The non-linearity in S-box is designed to cause intra symbol avalanche [16]
(that is every bit in the output symbol of the S-box ﬂips with a probability of half
for a single bit ﬂip in the input symbol), which is essential for the security of the
cipher. Nyberg proved that substitution functions generated by inverting elements in
GF(28) are diﬀerentially 4 uniform and are highly nonlinear [50]. The S-boxes thus
constructed are used in the substitution layer of the HD cipher. Note that, these
S-boxes are also used in the substitution layer of the AES cipher.
4.1.3 Symbol transposition layer
The symbol transposition layer is the ﬁrst of the two diﬀusion operations used in the
HD cipher. The aim of this layer is to permute the cipher state using a diﬀusion
optimal transformation. We use the matrix transpose operation which was shown to
be diﬀusion optimal [42].
4.1.4 HD encoding layer
The HD encoding transformation is the second diﬀusion operation used in the HD
cipher. The aim of this layer is to diﬀuse the intra symbol avalanche caused by the33
substitution layer to a large number of symbols in the resulting cipher state. We
propose to use our novel HD codes in the encoding layer. By picking appropriate
parameters for the HD code, it is possible to achieve the desirable level of error
correction capability and expansion in the diﬀusion layer. We expect this to lead to
resilience to channel errors when the cipher is used in block modes and appropriate
amount of savings in energy consumption when used in stream modes.
In this work we use a [4,4,256] HD code for rounds 1 through 7 and a [6,4,256]
HD code for rounds 8 and 9. The generator matrices for these HD codes are,
G(r)r=[1:::7] =
0
B
B
B
B
B
@
1 1 3 2
2 1 1 3
3 2 1 1
1 3 2 1
1
C
C
C
C
C
A
G(r)r=[8;9] =
0
B
B
B
B
B
@
1 1 3 2 189 71
2 1 1 3 169 27
3 2 1 1 192 209
1 3 2 1 91 179
1
C
C
C
C
C
A
To perform HD encoding, each column of the input cipher state is multiplied with
G(r) to obtain the output cipher state. The branch number (see Section 3.1) B(G(r))
of G(r)r=[1:::7] is 5 and G(r)r=[8;9] is 7.
4.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we brieﬂy analyze the security of HD ciphers by looking at the resis-
tance it oﬀers against some well known cryptanalytic attacks.34
4.2.1 Resistance to diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis
Diﬀerential cryptanalysis [6, 7] is a chosen plaintext-ciphertext attack that makes use
of the diﬀerence propagation property of a cipher to deduce the key bits. The diﬀer-
ence propagation property of an S-box is the relative number of all input pairs, that
for a given input diﬀerence, gives rise to a speciﬁc output diﬀerence. It is expressed
as propagation ratio [11]. Let xr
1 be any intermediate cipher state at round r result-
ing from the input plaintext P1. Similarly, let xr
2 be the corresponding intermediate
cipher state resulting from plaintext P2. The non zero symbols in xr
1 © xr
2 are called
active symbols or S-boxes. The diﬀerence propagation of consecutive rounds can be
concatenated across several rounds to form a diﬀerential trail. The propagation ratio
over all the rounds of a diﬀerential trail can be approximated by the product of the
propagation ratios of its active S-boxes. Diﬀerential cryptanalysis can break the HD
cipher with complexity less than O(2128) if the maximum possible propagation ratio
over all rounds is signiﬁcantly larger than 2¡127.
Linear cryptanalysis [45] is a known plaintext-ciphertext attack that makes use of
linearity in the cipher to obtain the key bits. Substitution is the only non-linear step
in most of the block ciphers including the proposed HD cipher. The linearity of an
active S-box can be approximated to the maximum input-output correlation exhibited
by it. The active S-boxes in a round are determined by the non zero symbols in the
selection vectors at the input of the round. The linearity of one round can be extended
to multiple rounds to form a linear trail. The correlation (measure of linearity) of
a linear trail (multiple rounds) can be approximated to the product of input-output
correlations of its active S-boxes. Linear cryptanalysis can break the HD cipher with
complexity less than O(2128) if the maximum possible correlation of any linear trail
over all rounds is signiﬁcantly larger than 2¡64.35
Hence, a lower bound on the number of active symbols in any linear or diﬀerential
trail will give a lower bound on the resistance of the cipher to linear and diﬀerential
cryptanalysis. In Theorem 4.2.3 we show that this lower bound for any four rounds
of HD cipher, starting with round r is B(G(r)) £ B(G(r + 1)). The lower bound on
the number of active S-boxes in any linear or diﬀerential trail in the last four rounds
of the HD cipher proposed here is B(G(7))B(G(8)) or 35. The S-boxes used in the
substitution layer of HD cipher have a maximum propagation ratio of 2¡6 and a
maximum input and output correlation of 2¡3. This shows that there are no four
round diﬀerential trails with predicted propagation ratio above 2¡215 and no four
round linear trails with predictable input output correlation above 2¡105. The initial
six rounds are added as a security margin towards future attacks, just as in AES.
Lemma 4.2.1. The total number of active columns of one round function is lower
bounded by the branch number of G, B(G).
This is true for any diﬀusion optimal transformation. Proof given in [13].
Theorem 4.2.2. The number of active S-boxes or symbols for a two round trail of HD
cipher is lower bounded by the branch number of the ﬁrst round of HD code, B(G(1)).
Proof. Consider the ﬁrst two rounds of HD cipher. Since substitution and key mixing
operate on the symbols locally, they do not aﬀect the propagation pattern. Hence
the number of active S-boxes or symbols for a two round trail is bounded by the
propagation property of G(1). From the deﬁnition of HD codes the sum of active
S-boxes before and after HD encoding of the ﬁrst round is lower bounded by B(G(1)).
Theorem 4.2.3. The number of active S-boxes or symbols for a four round trail
(starting with round r) of HD cipher is lower bounded by B(G(r)) £ B(G(r + 1)).
Proof. Proof given in [42].
4.2.2 Resistance to square attack
The Square attack [12] (also known as Integral attack [32] or the Saturation attack
[38]) makes use of the byte oriented nature of the Square block cipher which was36
the predecessor of AES. As AES is also a byte oriented cipher, this attack has been
extended to reduced versions of AES [37, 20]. The proposed HD cipher also comprises
of byte oriented operations which are loosely based on AES, hence HD ciphers with
fewer than seven rounds would be as weak as reduced versions of the AES.
Although the HD cipher is as secure as AES against most of the well known
attacks, the HD cipher uses a larger key length to achieve the same security level
as that of AES. Since, the key expansion is performed only once every session, its
computational overhead is negligible.
4.3 Error Correction Capacity
In this section, we prove bounds on the error correction capacity of the HD cipher.
After encryption, the ciphertext of length 36 bytes (equivalently 288 bits) is trans-
mitted across a noisy channel. Speciﬁcally, we consider a bursty channel [10] and use
the term “full weight burst error” to denote an error burst where all the symbols in
the burst are in error. We do this to calculate the lower bound on the error correction
capability. In order to formalize our analysis we introduce the following assumptions,
deﬁnitions and notations. A symbol of the cipher state that is in error (due to channel
or propagation due to decryption) is referred to as an error symbol. If a row/column
in the 4 £ 4 representation of the cipher state has more than one error symbols, it is
said to be an error row/column. Error correction capacity of a four round HD cipher
decryption is analyzed in Theorem 4.3.3.
Lemma 4.3.1. If there is at most 1 error row or column in the cipher state before the
ﬁrst HD decoding, then the error correction is complete after the second HD decoding.
Proof. Consider the ﬁrst three rounds of HD cipher decryption. Since the inverse
non-linear transform and round key addition and the transpose operations do not
convert an error symbol to an error free symbol and vice versa, it can be excluded
from the analysis. If there is only one error row in the cipher state before the ﬁrst
HD decoding, then the error correction will be complete after the ﬁrst decoding. This37
is because, the decoding takes place columnwise and each HD code has 1 byte error
correction capacity. If there is one error column, it will remain an error column even
after the ﬁrst HD decoding, however, the transpose operation will convert it to an
error row before the second HD decoding is performed. The second HD decoding
then completes the error correction.
Lemma 4.3.2. If there are at least 2 error columns in the cipher state before the
ﬁrst HD decoding, the error correction may remain incomplete after the second HD
decoding.
Proof. The two error columns before the ﬁrst HD decoding will remain in error even
after decoding. The transpose will make the two error columns into two error rows.
Now every column in the cipher state may have more than one error byte. Thus, the
second HD decoding may not be able to correct all errors.
We now analyze the maximum full weight burst error length that is guaranteed
to be corrected by a four round HD cipher. We assume columnwise transmission of
the ciphertext. Our analysis is independent of the starting and ending locations of
the burst with respect to the cipher state.
Theorem 4.3.3. The full weight burst error correcting capacity of a four round HD
cipher is 7.
Proof. The largest full weight burst error that can occur without causing a single
error column in the cipher state before the ﬁrst HD decoding is 6. An extra byte
in error either next to the starting/ending location of the burst will create one error
column. From lemma 4.3.1 we know that this is correctable. Hence, a full weight
burst of 7 bytes is correctable. However, a full weight burst of 8 bytes will create two
error columns and from lemma 4.3.2 we know that the decoding may fail.
From Theorem 4.3.3 we get the lower bound on the burst length for burst error
correction per block of HD cipher. A [36;16;256] RS code has a burst correction
capability of 10 bytes. However, since we use many small HD codes instead of one
large RS code, we expect HD cipher to be more energy eﬃcient than a traditional
cipher concatenated with the large RS code.38
4.4 Modes of Operation
Encrypting each plaintext block independently in Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode
does not provide semantic security. This is because, the adversary can distinguish
between two diﬀerent plaintexts just by observing the ciphertext. Moreover, if the
block length is not very large, the adversary can construct a table of known plaintext-
ciphertext pairs and use it as a lookup table to decode unknown plaintexts encrypted
with the same key. To improve the semantic security of block ciphers several other
modes have been suggested. The most popular of these are the Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) mode and the Counter (CTR) mode. The CBC mode encrypts plaintexts one
block at a time, hence it is referred to as block mode encryption. However, CTR
employs the underlying block cipher to produce a pseudo random key stream, which
is then bitwise XORed with the plaintext in the stream cipher style. Hence, CTR
mode is usually referred to as a stream mode. It has been shown in [28] that both CBC
and CTR modes have equivalent security for a given block cipher. In this section,
we construct and analyze the performance of HD cipher in both block and stream
modes.
4.4.1 Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode
In the CBC mode, every plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext
block before encryption. The ﬁrst plaintext block is XORed with an Initialization
Vector (IV). The chaining of ciphertext block makes CBC mode more semantically
secure compared to ECB mode. In our work, we implement HD cipher in CBC mode
and compare it with traditional concatenated systems in terms of error correction
capabilities.
To evaluate the energy eﬃciency, we measured the actual energy consumption39
of the HD cipher on a testbed and compared it with that of traditional systems.
The testbed (Fig 4.2) consists of an Intrinsyc CerfCube [27] with a 233 MHz ARM
processor, 16MB Flash and 32 MB SDRAM, running Debian Linux operating system.
The power consumed by the CPU in running the encryption algorithms is measured
as a function of input power supply to the CerfCube. A separate DC power supply
is given to the CerfCube to permit measurements. The current is measured using
Labview from the GPIB interface of the power supply. To eliminate eﬀects of any
programs running in the background, the current consumption is ﬁrst tested when
no other tasks are running. The diﬀerence in currents when the algorithm is running
and the idle current (in Amperes) is taken as the actual current consumption. In
the experiments, since voltage variation is seen to be extremely small (measured to
be less than 0:025%) we use a constant value. We use OProﬁle [51] to measure the
exact time taken by the algorithms to run. The energy consumed by the algorithms
is the product of power drawn from the DC source and the time required to complete
execution.
The energy measurements are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. We can observe from
the tables that the HD cipher saves 30% and 12% energy per byte during encryption
and decryption compared to the traditional systems.
To evaluate the performance (error correction) of the HD cipher, we compare it
with concatenated systems A and B (described below) with respect to error correction
capacity.
² Concatenated system A: uses AES (128-bit) cipher concatenated with [36,16,256]
Reed Solomon code.
² Concatenated system B: uses AES (128-bit) cipher concatenated with convolu-
tional codes having rates varying from 1=2 to 1=6.40
Figure 4.2: Hardware Setup
Block Voltage Current Time Energy
Mode (volts) (amps) (secs) (Joules)
HD Encryption 5.003 0.237 8.9 10.55
AES Encryption 5.003 0.237 6.6 7.82
RS Encoding 5.003 0.238 6.3 7.05
HD Decryption 5.003 0.239 24.1 28.51
AES Decryption 5.003 0.238 8.2 9.76
RS Decoding 5.003 0.239 19.3 23.07
Table 4.1: Voltage, current, time and energy measurements for the one million HD,
AES and RS encryption/encoding and decryption/decoding operations.
Per Byte HD AES-RS
Energy (¹J) cipher cipher-code
Encode/Encryption 0.65 0.95
Decode/Decryption 1.80 2.05
Table 4.2: Per byte energy consumption for encoding/encryption, decod-
ing/decryption operations of the error correcting HD cipher and the AES-RS con-
catenated system.41
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0 0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Channel Bit Error Rate
P
o
s
t
 
D
e
c
r
y
p
t
i
o
n
 
B
i
t
 
E
r
r
o
r
 
R
a
t
e
HD cipher
AES + [36,16,246] RS code
Figure 4.3: Comparison of error resilience of HD cipher and AES concatenated with
[36,16,256] Reed Solomon codes.
Wireless communication medium is characterized by bursty errors and fading phe-
nomenon. Which implies that the bit errors occurring in wireless channels have mem-
ory. Alajaji, et al.[2] proposed an additive Markov channel (AMC) model for slow
fading wireless channels. According to this model, the channel can be described by
bit error rate and correlation parameters. The burstyness of the channel can be con-
trolled by the correlation parameter. In our experiments we set the correlation to 0:9
and varied the bit error rate from 0:0005 to 0:2.
Fig. 4.3 plots the post decryption bit error rate of the proposed 128 bit HD
cipher and the concatenated system A against channel bit error rate. It can be
observed that HD cipher and the concatenated system are comparable in terms of
error correction capacity over all the channel bit error rates. This is because, both
HD cipher and the Reed Solomon code used in the concatenated system are burst
error correcting codes with similar coding rates. However, as the error correction is42
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of error resilience of HD cipher and AES concatenated with
Convolutional codes. Notice that the coding rate of HD cipher is between 1=5 and
1=6, yet it outperforms the 1/6 rate concatenated system.
performed during decryption within the HD cipher, there is roughly a savings of two
rounds per encryption/decryption compared to the concatenated system.
For the second set of experiments, we compare the proposed 128 bit HD cipher
with the concatenated system B. Diﬀerent convolutional codes with rates 1=2, 1=3,
1=4, 1=5 and 1=6 are considered. Since, the channel is assumed to be bursty, a block
interleaver is added after convolutional encoder to optimize the performance of the
concatenated system. Hard decision Viterbi decoder [10] is used at the receiver.
Fig. 4.4 plots the post decryption bit error rate of the proposed HD cipher and the
concatenated system B. The HD cipher clearly outperforms the concatenated system
for all rates 1=2 through 1=6. Note that, the coding rate of the HD cipher is between
that of the concatenated systems with rate 1=5 and 1=6 yet it outperforms the rate 1=6
concatenated system. Although convolutional codes are more light weight compared
to Reed Solomon codes, the total number of operations when it is combined with 1043
round AES cipher is approximately equal to the number of operations in a 10 round
HD cipher.
4.4.2 Counter (CTR) mode
In the CTR mode, the block cipher is used to encrypt a counter value which is incre-
mented for successive encryptions. The encrypted counter values makeup a keystream
which is XORed with the plaintext bits to produce the ciphertext bits. Block ciphers
act as pseudo random number generators (PRNGs), hence this mode is semantically
more secure compared to the ECB mode. Since, the encryption of plaintext takes
place one bit at a time, this mode of encryption is usually referred to as the stream
mode. In this work, we implement the HD cipher in CTR mode as a component of
the current 802.11 wireless LAN security protocol called the Counter Mode Encryp-
tion with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Protocol (often referred to
as CCMP). We then compare the performance of our proposed HD-CCMP with the
traditional AES-CCMP.
The CCMP currently uses the AES block cipher (see Fig. 4.5) to provide both
authentication and conﬁdentiality.
The drawback of AES-CCMP is that, it consumes more energy compared to its
predecessor, the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). This is because, the RC4 cipher
used in WEP is a stream cipher; whereas, the AES used in CCMP is inherently a
block cipher used in stream (counter or CTR) mode. Therefore, a full 10 round
AES needs to be performed to encrypt every 128 bits of Message Protocol Data Unit
(MPDU) (see Fig 4.5).
By using the HD cipher instead of the AES (see Fig. 4.5) we propose to make
CCMP more energy eﬃcient. Let C denote the 128 bit counter, X denote the MPDU
stream (data payload + MIC) of length N-bits to be encrypted and Xi denote the i-th44
Figure 4.5: Block Diagram of CCMP.
288 bit block of X (where, i 2 f1:::dN=288eg). The HD encryption under key K, de-
noted by EK, in the CTR mode is Yi = EK(counter+(i¡1))©Xi; 8i 2 f1:::dN=288eg.
Here, Y represents the encrypted MPDU stream. In the CTR mode, the HD cipher
securely expands the 128 bit counter to 288 bit keystream, thus encrypting more than
twice the number of bits per encryption compared to the AES. The number of en-
cryptions required by the HD cipher per N bit frame is dN=288e, whereas for the AES
it is dN=128e. We therefore expect to do only 50% of work to achieve the same level
of conﬁdentiality compared to the AES-CCMP. Moreover, as n increases we expect
to observe larger reduction in energy consumption. Although, from a security stand-
point we can use the HD cipher in CBC-MAC mode for authentication as well, this
does not cause additional savings in terms of energy, hence we use the HD-cipher in
the CTR mode for conﬁdentiality only. From an implementation standpoint, most of
the operations of the HD cipher are similar to the AES, hence signiﬁcant portions of45
code can be reused. Therefore, using two diﬀerent ciphers in CCMP does not impose
a signiﬁcantly larger code space requirement.
The HD and the AES ciphers consume 0:29¹ J and 0:49¹ J (from Table 4.1) of
energy per byte respectively. Hence, HD cipher in counter mode results in about 40%
reduction in energy consumption compared to the AES cipher.
4.5 Conclusions
The construction of HD cipher from HD codes proves the latter’s potential as building
blocks for ciphers. The branch number of HD codes provides adequate diﬀusion to
the HD cipher. Hence, making them secure against well known cryptanalytic attacks.
The error resilience analysis of HD cipher revealed that the error correction capacity
of HD codes are not compromised because of their use inside the cipher. The joint
security and error resilience properties favors HD cipher as a potential solution to
current cipher design challenges. The HD cipher is employed both in block and stream
modes. In block mode, the HD cipher corrects bursty channel errors and hence is more
error resilient compared to traditional ciphers. Furthermore, HD cipher when used in
stream mode has more encryption throughput compared to the popular AES cipher.
Energy consumption analysis revealed that HD cipher is 40% more energy eﬃcient.
The error resilience, higher encryption throughput and energy eﬃciency properties
makes the proposed HD cipher an ideal replacement for the AES cipher in resource
constrained and noisy wireless environments.Chapter 5
The Pyramid Cipher
In Chapter 1 we pointed out error resilience, energy eﬃciency, speed (number of
rounds) and encryption throughput as four important present day design challenges
in block ciphers. In Chapter 4 we showed that the High Diﬀusion ciphers address three
of the four challenges: error resilience, energy eﬃciency and encryption throughput.
However, the number of rounds in the HD cipher, which is 10, is equal to that of
the AES (Rijndael) cipher. This can be largely attributed to the structural similarity
between the AES cipher and the HD cipher.
In this chapter, we investigate techniques to reduce the number of rounds in the
cipher. Speciﬁcally, we observe that by making the diﬀusion layer as large as pos-
sible, avalanche eﬀect can be caused within fewer rounds. Based on this philosophy
we design a ﬁve round error correcting cipher called the Pyramid. We show that
the reduction in the number of rounds, does not adversely impact the security of the
cipher. Further, we show that the Pyramid cipher is as secure as the AES cipher
against linear, diﬀerential and square attacks. We derive bounds on the error correct-
ing capacity of the Pyramid cipher and through simulations show that they are as
error resilient as the Reed Solomon (RS) codes and outperform convolutional codes
by 60%. Energy analysis experiments on a 32 bit test bed reveals that, Pyramid
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cipher is 6 ¡ 10% faster and energy eﬃcient than a concatenated system. Finally,
we implement the Pyramid cipher in stream (counter) mode and show that they are
secure random number generators using the DIEHARD statistical test suite with an
higher encryption throughput ¸ 192 bits (compared to the AES cipher).
5.1 Structure and Design
The Pyramid is a ﬁve round cipher that encrypts 128 bit plaintexts using a 192 bit
secret key to produce 192 bit ciphertexts as shown in Fig. 5.1. Since the cipherstate
expands as it goes through the cipher, we call it the Pyramid cipher. The round func-
tion in the Pyramid cipher consists of three distinct layers: the key mixing layer, the
non linear substitution layer and the linear diﬀusion layer. The Pyramid decryption
is the exact inverse of the encryption operation.
5.1.1 Key mixing layer
In the key mixing layer the round key is XORed with the cipherstate. As Pyramid
cipher is a key iterated block cipher, there are six key mixing operations with the
round key (denoted by © in Fig. 5.1). The six round keys are generated from the 192
bit secret key using a key expansion algorithm, which is similar to that of the AES
key expansion algorithm.
5.1.2 Substitution layer
The substitution layer consists of simple table lookup operations. The substitution
tables are usually referred to as the S-boxes. Each byte in the input cipherstate is
substituted for a byte in the output cipherstate. Let Ci;j represent the j-th byte of48
the i-th round cipherstate. Then the cipherstate after substitution Cs
i+1 is,
8jC
s
i+1;j = S[Ci;j] (5.1.0)
The substitution operations are denoted by S in Fig. 5.1. During decryption, the
substitution boxes are replaced by inverse substitution boxes. The S-boxes and the
inverse S-boxes are identical to those used in the HD cipher.
5.1.3 Diﬀusion layer
In the diﬀusion layer, the cipherstate is multiplied with a diﬀusion matrix G.
Ci+1 = C
s
i+1 £ G (5.1.0)
In the ﬁrst three rounds the entire 16 byte cipherstate is multiplied by a single 16 £
16 diﬀusion matrix called the Mix Column (MC) matrix (see Fig. 5.1), GMC with
operations in GF(256). In the fourth round however, the 16 byte input cipherstate is
multiplied with a single 16 £ 24 diﬀusion matrix called the HD encoding matrix (see
Fig. 5.1), GHD, in GF(256) to produce a 24 byte output cipherstate. The MC and the
HD matrices have branch numbers 17 and 24 respectively. The high branch numbers
are important to achieve resistance against cryptanalytic attacks (see Section 5.2).
Details on the construction of the diﬀusion matrices is provided in Section 5.1.3 and
5.1.3. The ﬁfth (ﬁnal) round does not have any diﬀusion operation. However, the ﬁfth
round cipherstate consists of 24 bytes and hence requires 24 substitution operations
instead of 16. Notice that, in the diﬀusion layer of the Pyramid cipher is larger and
does not have any ShiftRow [15] operation (when compared to the HD and AES
ciphers). This is because we operate on the entire cipherstate in each round. As the
cipher expands the input state as it goes through the encryption process, we call it the
Pyramid cipher. During decryption, the inverse MC matrix replace the MC matrix49
and HD decoding operation is replaced by the HD encoding operation. We use the
Euclidean errors and erasures decoding [36] with slight modiﬁcation to decode the 24
byte cipherstate. The decoding procedure is described in Section5.3.
Figure 5.1: Full ﬁve round Pyramid block cipher
Construction of the HD encoding matrix
The HD encoding refers to multiplying the cipherstate by the generator matrix of a
[24;16;256] High Diﬀusion (HD) code (see Chapter 3. We construct the [24;16;256]
HD code from [32;16;256] shortened Reed Solomon (RS) code [10] with generator
polynomial,
gRS(X) = X
8 + X
4 + X
3 + X
2 + 1 (5.1.0)
From gRS(X) we get the generator matrix, GSYS
RS , of the RS code in systematic form
[36]. The ﬁrst 8 columns of GSYS
RS are punctured to derive the diﬀusion matrix, GHD.50
From Theorem 3.4.1 it follows that GHD obtained by puncturing GSYS
RS in this manner
generates a [24;16;256] HD code. The branch number of [24;16;256] HD code is,
B(GHD) = 24 + 1 = 25: (5.1.0)
Construction of the MC matrix
We generate the MC matrix, GMC, by puncturing the ﬁrst 8 columns of GHD. As
punctured HD codes are HD codes (Theorem 3.4.2), GMC is actually a generator for
[16;16;256] HD codes with branch number,
B(GMC) = 16 + 1 = 17 (5.1.0)
The inverse MC matrix G
¡1
MC is obtained by inverting GMC in GF(256).
5.1.4 Rationale for larger diﬀusion operations
In this section we discuss the rationale for employing larger diﬀusion operations (com-
pared to AES) in the Pyramid cipher. Lets take the wide trail structure of AES and
replace multiple smaller diﬀusion operations in each round with one large diﬀusion
operation. Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3 represent the block diagrams of the traditional wide
trail structure and our modiﬁed wide trail structure respectively. Note that in the
wide trail structure, a single active byte (one byte diﬀerence) in the input plaintext,
will travel to all the bytes in the cipherstate by the end of the second round. How-
ever in the modiﬁed wide trail structure, a single active byte in the input travels to
all the 16 bytes of the cipherstate in just one round. This suggests that by using
larger diﬀusion operations, we can achieve trails with higher number of active bytes
in fewer rounds. However, reduction in the number of rounds does not necessarily
imply reduction in energy consumption. This is because, as the diﬀusion operations51
get larger each round gets heavier. The actual savings in energy depends on the num-
ber of rounds reduced, eﬃcient implementation of each of the rounds and the weight
of the larger diﬀusion operations. The number of rounds is determined by looking at
the best possible attack on the cipher. In the next section we analyze the resistance
of the Pyramid cipher against some well known attacks.
Figure 5.2: Active byte propagation in the wide trail strategy
Figure 5.3: Active byte propagation due to large diﬀusion operation52
5.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we brieﬂy analyze the security of the Pyramid cipher by looking at
the resistance it oﬀers against some well known cryptanalytic attacks.
5.2.1 Resistance to linear and diﬀerential cryptanalysis
From discussion on linear and diﬀerential cryptanalysis from Section 4.2.1 it follows
that a lower bound on the number of active bytes in any linear or diﬀerential trail will
give a lower bound on the resistance of the cipher to linear and diﬀerential cryptanal-
ysis. For any three round trail of the Pyramid cipher, the minimum number of active
bytes is shown to be greater than or equal to 34 in Theorem 5.2.2. This shows that
there are no three round linear trails with predictable input output correlation above
2¡3£34 = 2¡102 and no three round diﬀerential trails with predictable propagation
ratio above 2¡6£34 = 2¡204.
Lemma 5.2.1. The minimum number of active bytes in any one round trail of the
Pyramid cipher is 17.
Proof. The key XOR and substitution do not turn an active byte into an inactive byte
and vice versa. The sum of active bytes in the input and the output cipherstate of
a one round trail entirely depends on the branch number of the HD encoding matrix
GHD. We know from (5.1.3)that B(GHD) = 17.
Theorem 5.2.2. The minimum number of active bytes in any three round trail of
the Pyramid cipher is 34.
Proof. Fig. 5.4 represents a three round trail. The minimum number of active bytes
in any three round trail of the Pyramid cipher is minΣ3
0(±Ci). This is equal to,
min(Σ1
0(±Ci)+Σ3
2(±Ci)). From Lemma 5.2.1 we have min(Σ1
0(±Ci)) = min(Σ3
2(±Ci)) =53
17. Therefore, the minimum number of active bytes in any three round trail of the
Pyramid cipher is 34.
Figure 5.4: Three round trail of the Pyramid cipher
5.2.2 Resistance to square attack
The proposed ciphers also comprises of byte oriented operations which are loosely
based on the HD cipher. Here we show the application of Square attack on four
round Pyramid cipher. However, extending this attack to ﬁve rounds has not been
possible.
Square attack on four round Pyramid cipher
The Square attack [12] (also known as Integral attack [32] or the Saturation attack
[38]) utilizes the byte oriented nature of the Square block cipher. As AES is also
a byte oriented cipher, this attack has been extended to reduced versions of AES
[37, 20]. The proposed cipher also comprises of byte oriented operations which are54
loosely based on the AES and Square [12] ciphers. Here we show the application of
Square attack on four round Pyramid cipher. However, extending this attack to ﬁve
rounds has not been possible.
Square attack on four round Pyramid cipher
We now describe some notations, that are similar to those used in the original Square
attack. Let Λ-set be a set of 256 states that are all diﬀerent in some of the state bytes
(the active) and all equal in the other state bytes (the passive). Let ¸ be the set of
indices of the active bytes. We have,
8x;y 2 Λ :
(
xi;j 6= yi;j for (i;j) 2 ¸
xi;j = yi;j for (i;j) 62 ¸
(5.2.0)
Consider a Λ-set in which all 16 bytes are active. After the ﬁrst round, the
minimum number of active bytes in the Λ-set is 1. This is because, the branch
number of MC matrix in round one is 17. However, at the end of second round the
Λ-set will have all 16 bytes active. This is still the case at the input to the third
round. Let ai, bi, i 2 f1:::16g denote the Λ-set at the input and the output of the
third round respectively. Then,
M
a2Λ
bi =
M
(aGMC)
= g1;i
M
a2Λ
a1 © g2;i
M
a2Λ
a2 © ¢ ¢ ¢ © g16;i
M
a2Λ
a16
= 0 © 0 © ¢ ¢ ¢ © 0 = 0
Since the bytes at the input to the third round range over all possible values, they
are balanced over the ¸ set. Due to this, the balance property is preserved at the end55
of round three [12]. However, the substitution operations in round four destroys the
balance property.
In order to perform the four round attack, 256 plaintexts which diﬀer in all the
16 byte positions are selected. The ciphertexts for these plaintexts are obtained. The
ﬁrst few bytes of the ﬁfth and the sixth round key are guessed. The intermediate
cipherstate at the end of third round is calculated for all the known ciphertexts.
The balancedness of the derived intermediate cipherstate is tested. If the cipherstate
is balanced, then the guessed sub-key is correct with a high probability. Although
this attack works well for four round Pyramid cipher, it has not been possible to
meaningfully extend it to ﬁve rounds.
5.3 Error Correcting Capacity
Based on minimum distance decoding and Theorem 5.3.1 the error correcting capacity
of the Pyramid cipher is four bytes.
Theorem 5.3.1. The error correcting capacity of the Pyramid cipher consisting of
[24,16,256] HD code is four bytes.
Proof. As the substitution and the key XOR operations are performed one byte at a
time, a byte of ciphertext in error before decryption will translate to an errored byte
at the same exact location after key XORs and inverse substitution but before the HD
decoding operation. HD decoding is the only error correcting operation performed
in the Pyramid cipher. Therefore the byte error correcting capacity of the Pyramid
cipher is directly related to that of the HD code used in the fourth round. All HD
codes are MDS codes (Theorem 3.3.2), therefore the [24;16;256] HD code should
satisfy the Singleton bound with equality. The minimum distance, dmin, between any56
two codewords in the [24;16;256] HD code is therefore,
dmin = 24 ¡ 16 + 1 = 9 (5.3.0)
The error correcting capacity, t, of any linear block code is x
dmin
2 y symbols. Therefore,
the error correcting capacity of the [24;16;256] HD code and hence the Pyramid cipher
is x9
2y = 4 bytes.
5.4 Decoding Procedure
We use the Euclidean error and erasure correcting decoding procedure as described
in [36] with slight modiﬁcation. Let v(X) and r(X) represent the transmitted and
the received codewords respectively. The error pattern is e(X) = r(X) ¡ v(X). As
v(X) = m(X)g(X), where m(X) is the message and g(X) is the generator polynomial
of [32;16;256] shortened RS code. Solutions ®i to g(X) are also solutions to v(X).
g(X) has 16 solutions. Therefore, for 1 · i · 16; v(®i) = 0. r(®i) = v(®i) + e(®i) =
e(®i) are called as the syndromes, denoted by Si. An all zero syndrome indicates that
there are no errors less than or equal to 16 bytes. If there are say v · 8 errors, we
get equations of the form,
Si = ej1®
ij1 + ej2®
ij2 + ::: + ejv®
ijv (5.4.0)
For 1 · i · v, ¯i = ®ji are the error locations and ±i = eji are the error values.
The ﬁrst step in error correction is to determine the error locations. We form the
error location polynomial ¾(X) such that ¯i’s are the solutions of this polynomial.
That is,
¾(X) = (1 ¡ ¯1(X))(1 ¡ ¯2(X)) ¢ ¢ ¢ (1 ¡ ¯v(X)) (5.4.0)
The syndrome polynomial is given by,
S(X) = S1 + S2X + ¢ ¢ ¢ + S17X
16 + ¢ ¢ ¢ (5.4.0)57
However, only the ﬁrst 16 coeﬃcients in (5.4) are known. The ﬁrst 16 terms in
the expansion ¾(X)S(X) are denoted by Z0(X). That is, Z0(X) = [¾(X)S(X)]16.
Therefore, unique pair of solutions to
¾(X)S(X) ´ Z0(X)modX
16 (5.4.0)
can be used to correct v · 8 errors in the received codeword. Either the Berlekamp’s
algorithm [4] or the Euclidean algorithm [36] can be used to solving the key equation
(5.4).
However, the HD codes we use in the Pyramid cipher are obtained by puncturing
24 bytes of the shortened [32;16;256] RS code. This puncturing will result in poor
error correction if the above decoding procedure is used directly. The punctured
codeword bytes are called erasures. Since, we know the location of erasures, we can
construct the erasure location polynomial ¯(X) =
Q24+e
l=1 (1 ¡ ®jl(X)), where e is the
number of additional erasures that may have occurred beyond the puncturing used to
obtain HD codes from shortened RS codes. In the received codeword, the location of
erasures is substituted by zeros. This introduces 24 + e errors additional to v errors
that are channel induced. However we only need to solve for v error locations. The
modiﬁed key equation is now,
¾(X)¯(X)S(X) ´ Z0(X)modX
16 (5.4.0)
Since, S(X) and ¯(X) are known, we can calculate T(X) = [¯(X)S(X)]16. Equation
5.4 can be reduced to,
¾(X)T(X) ´ Z0(X)modX
16 (5.4.0)
Berlekamp’s or Euclidean algorithm can be used to solve this equation to get the
location and value of v · 4;e = 0 errors or e · 8;v = 0 erasures or e=2+v · 4 errors
and erasures.58
5.5 Modes of Operation
In this section we construct and analyze the energy eﬃciency and error resilience of
the Pyramid cipher in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) block mode and counter (CTR)
stream mode.
5.5.1 Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode
In the CBC mode, every plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext
block before encryption. The ﬁrst plaintext block is XORed with an Initialization
Vector (IV). We implement HD cipher in CBC mode and compare it with traditional
concatenated systems in terms of energy eﬃciency and error resilience.
We use the testbed consisting of an Intrinsyc CerfCube [27] as described in Sec-
tion 4.4.1. We measured the energy consumed for one million encryptions/decryptions
of Pyramid and the AES cipher and one million RS encoding and decoding opera-
tions. The measurements are given in Table 5.1. The measured energy consumption
is divided by 16 million to obtain the per byte energy consumption. The per byte
energy consumed by Pyramid and AES operating in block modes like ECB and CBC
is about 0:8 ¹J and 0:49 ¹J respectively. The energy consumption per byte by the
concatenated system, AES cipher followed by RS code (AES-RS), is 0:9 ¹J. This
shows that our proposed joint approach to encryption and encoding is 10% more
energy eﬃcient compared to the traditional disjoint approach. Similarly, the Pyra-
mid decryption is 6% more energy eﬃcient compared to the concatenated AES-RS
decoding and decryption.
To evaluate the error resilience of the Pyramid cipher, we perform simulations
with both burst error and uniform error channel models and compare it with the59
Block Voltage Current Time Energy
Mode (volts) (amps) (secs) (Joules)
Pyramid Encryption 5.003 0.238 11.2 13.14
AES Encryption 5.003 0.237 6.6 7.825
RS Encoding 5.003 0.237 5.8 6.87
Pyramid Decryption 5.003 0.239 23.7 28.33
AES Decryption 5.003 0.238 8.2 9.76
RS Decoding 5.003 0.238 17.2 20.48
Table 5.1: Voltage, current, time and energy measurements for the one million Pyra-
mid, AES and RS encryption/encoding and decryption/decoding operations.
error resilience of AES concatenated with a) Reed Solomon codes (AES-RS), b) Con-
volutional codes (AES-Conv) and c) Low Density Parity Check (AES-LDPC) codes.
Wireless communication medium is characterized by bursty errors and fading phe-
nomenon. Which implies that the bit errors occurring in wireless channels have mem-
ory. [2] proposed an additive Markov channel (AMC) model for slow fading wireless
channels. According to this model, the channel can be described by bit error rate
and correlation parameters. The burstyness of the channel can be controlled by the
correlation parameter. In our experiments we set the correlation to 0:8 and varied
the bit error rate from 10¡3 to 5 £ 10¡1.
First, we compare the Pyramid cipher with AER-RS under the AMC channel
conditions. We use [24;16;256] RS codes in AES-RS to maintain the same coding
rate as the Pyramid cipher. Fig. 5.5 plots the post decryption bit error rate of
the Pyramid cipher and AES-RS. We can observe that both the systems perform
comparably under all the channel conditions. This shows that there is no loss or gain
of error resilience due to joint error correction and encryption.
Next, we compare the Pyramid cipher with AES-CONV under the AMC channel
conditions. The convolutional codes with rates 0:5; 0:33; 0:25; 0:2; 0:167 are used.60
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Figure 5.5: Post decryption BER of PYRAMID and AES concatenated with
[24,16,256] RS codes under AMC channel model with correlation 0.8.
Since, the convolutional codes are not burst error correcting codes, we use an inter-
leaver with a depth of 16 to improve its error correcting capacity. Fig. 5.6 plots the
post decryption bit error rate of Pyramid cipher and AES-CONV for diﬀerent coding
rates. We can observe that Pyramid cipher with a coding rate of 0 :67 clearly outper-
forms AES-CONV with coding rates 0:5; 0:33 and 0:25. This shows that although
convolutional codes are lighter than RS and HD codes, they do not perform as well
under bursty channel conditions (like in wireless medium). We can observe from the
Fig. 5.6 that the convolutional codes require about 60% more redundancy to equal
the performance of the Pyramid cipher.
Finally, we compare the Pyramid cipher and AES-LDPC with similar coding rate.
The LDPC codes are known to perform extremely well in non-bursty (uniformly
distributed errors) channels. Therefore, for this simulation, we use binary symmetric
channel [66] model to generate uniformly random errors. The LDPC decoding is an
iterative process and the error resilience of LDPC codes improve with the number of
iterations. However, the energy spent in decoding is also proportional to the number61
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Figure 5.6: Post decryption BER of PYRAMID and AES concatenated with Convo-
lutional codes under AMC channel model with correlation 0.8.
of iterations. Hence in energy constrained systems it may not be feasible to perform
too many iterations. In the concatenated system AES-LDPC we ﬁrst use 2 step LDPC
decoding (which is as heavy as HD decoding) and then repeat the experiment with
250 step LDPC decoding. Fig. 5.7 plots the post decryption bit error rates of Pyramid
cipher and AES-LDPC. We can observe that the performance of the Pyramid cipher
is in between the 2 step and 250 step LDPC decoding. This shows that even in binary
symmetric channel conditions, the performance of the Pyramid cipher is comparable
to LDPC codes.
5.5.2 Counter (CTR) mode
In the CTR mode, the block cipher is used to encrypt a counter value which is incre-
mented for successive encryptions. The encrypted counter values makeup a pseudo-
random keystream which is XORed with the plaintext bits to produce the ciphertext62
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0 10
−5
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0 BINARY SYMMETRIC CHANNEL
CHANNEL BIT ERROR RATE
P
O
S
T
 
D
E
C
R
Y
P
T
I
O
N
 
B
I
T
 
E
R
R
O
R
 
R
A
T
E
PYRAMID
AES−LDPC−250
AES−LDPC−2
Figure 5.7: Post decryption BER of PYRAMID and AES concatenated with LDPC
codes under BSC channel model.
bits. Block ciphers act as pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs). Since, the en-
cryption of plaintext takes place one bit at a time, this mode of encryption is usually
referred to as the stream mode. Pyramid cipher can be used in CTR mode as well.
However, the error correction property of the Pyramid cipher cannot be used when
it is operated in this mode. An advantage of using the Pyramid cipher in CTR mode
is that the expansion of cipherstate during encryption results in higher encryption
throughput compared to the AES cipher.
we slightly improvise the encryption throughput of the Pyramid cipher by using
[36;16;256] HD codes in round four instead of [24;16;256]. This will increase the
encryption throughput to 256 bits. Since only encryption is performed in stream
modes, we do not consider the decoding and decryption procedures for the enhanced
Pyramid cipher. We empirically test the quality (randomness) of the pseudorandom
keystreams generated by the enhanced Pyramid cipher using the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommended DIEHARD battery of statistical
tests. The DIEHARD test suite [40] consists of a variety of statistical tests like, the63
CTR Energy/byte
Mode (¹ Joules)
Pyramid (36) 0.50
AES 0.49
Table 5.2: Energy consumption per byte for the enhanced Pyramid cipher and the
AES cipher operating in CTR mode.
birthday spacings, overlapping permutations, ranks of matrices, count the 1s, mini-
mum distance test, random spheres test and runs test. We implement the Pyramid
cipher in the CTR mode and initialize the seed to an all zero value. The secret key
is initialized to a random 192 bit value. Using this setup, we generate about 10
MB of pseudorandom sequence. The DIEHARD statistical test suite is executed on
the pseudorandom sequence. These tests are then repeated for diﬀerent seed values.
Experimental results reveal that, for all the chosen seed values, the pseudorandom
sequence generated by the Pyramid cipher passed each of the statistical tests. This
shows that, the Pyramid cipher is a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generator.
We calculate the energy consumption of the enhanced Pyramid cipher on the
testbed (for details on the testbed see Section 4.4.1). The per byte energy consump-
tion for the Pyramid and the AES used in stream modes are given in Table 5.2. We
can observe that although the Pyramid and the AES ciphers consume almost the same
amount of energy per byte, the Pyramid cipher has twice the encryption throughput
compared to the AES cipher.64
5.6 Conclusions
The Pyramid cipher is a major improvement over the HD cipher in terms of round
reduction. In comparison with the popular ten round AES cipher, the Pyramid
cipher uses larger diﬀusion operations, consists of only ﬁve rounds, corrects four
bytes of errors per ciphertext block during decryption (no error correction in AES)
and has a variable encryption throughput ¸ 192 bits. The bounds on the error and
erasure correcting capacity of the Pyramid cipher showed that they are as eﬃcient as
the RS codes. Energy consumption analysis and experiments on the 32 bit testbed
revealed that the Pyramid cipher used in block modes consume 6¡10% lesser energy
compared to the concatenated system: AES followed by RS codes. Employing the
Pyramid cipher in the stream mode we showed that they are good pseudorandom
number generators and have a higher encryption throughput compared to the AES
cipher.Chapter 6
Summary
We identiﬁed error resilience, energy eﬃciency, encryption throughput and speed of
encryption as four main challenges facing present day secure wireless communica-
tions in resource constrained environments. These challenges serve as motivational
factors to combine error correction with encryption, which forms the basis of our ap-
proach. Although codes and ciphers have contrasting properties, we concentrated on
the similarities in order to combine them. In particular, we identiﬁed the property of
diﬀusion that is exhibited by most block codes and required by most block ciphers.
We proposed the High Diﬀusion codes that possess the best possible diﬀusion and
yet satisfy the Singleton bound for the minimum distance between codewords thus
making them ideal candidates for error resilient cryptographic primitives. Although
there is no systematic technique to generate HD codes, the ﬂexibility to generate HD
generator matrices from RS generator matrices makes it easy to derive large HD codes
without having to go through brute force search. The close relationship of HD codes
with the popular Reed Solomon codes makes them easy to study, analyze and port
into existing systems.
The construction of the HD cipher from HD codes proves the latter’s potential
as building blocks for ciphers. The high branch number of HD codes used the HD
6566
cipher was a key factor in achieving resistance against linear and diﬀerential attacks.
The error resilience analysis of HD cipher revealed that the error correction capacity
of HD codes are not compromised because of their use inside the cipher. The joint
security and error resilience properties favors HD cipher as a potential solution to
current wireless security challenges. The HD cipher is employed both in block and
stream modes. In block mode, the HD cipher is 12 ¡ 30% more energy eﬃcient and
performs equivalently in terms of error correction compared to traditional systems.
Furthermore, HD cipher when used in stream mode has more encryption throughput
compared to the popular AES cipher. Energy consumption analysis revealed that HD
cipher is 40% more energy eﬃcient. The error resilience, higher encryption throughput
and energy eﬃciency properties makes the proposed HD cipher an ideal replacement
for the AES cipher in the CCMP protocol.
The Pyramid cipher is a major improvement over the HD cipher in which we
could achieve reduction in the number of rounds along with error resilience, higher
encryption throughput and energy eﬃciency. The bounds on the error and erasure
correcting capacity of the Pyramid cipher showed that they are as eﬃcient as the RS
codes. Through simulations we showed that the Pyramid cipher performs comparably
with RS and LDPC codes and outperforms convolutional codes by 60%. We also show
that the ﬁve round Pyramid cipher is as secure as the ten round AES and reduction
in the rounds does not compromise the security. By employing the Pyramid cipher
in the stream mode, we showed that they are good pseudorandom number generators
and have a higher encryption throughput compared to the AES cipher. Energy con-
sumption analysis and experiments on the revealed that the Pyramid cipher used in
block modes consume 6 ¡ 10% lesser energy compared to the concatenated system:
AES followed by RS codes. In stream modes, both Pyramid and the AES cipher have
comparable performance in terms of energy eﬃciency, however the Pyramid cipher67
has a higher encryption throughput.
The construction of the HD and the Pyramid error correcting ciphers from FECs
provides a mathematical framework for truly integrating block ciphers with block
codes. The extensive set of experiments and simulations show that combining error
correction and encryption leads to energy eﬃcient, error resilient and secure ciphers.Publications from the Work
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